

ҚАЗАҚСТАН РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫ БІЛІМ ЖӘНЕ ҒЫЛЫМ МИНИСТРЛІГІ  
Л.Н. ГУМИЛЕВ АТЫНДАҒЫ ЕУРАЗИЯ ҰЛТТЫҚ УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ



Студенттер мен жас ғалымдардың  
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XI Халықаралық ғылыми конференциясының  
БАЯНДАМАЛАР ЖИНАҒЫ

СБОРНИК МАТЕРИАЛОВ  
XI Международной научной конференции  
студентов и молодых ученых  
**«НАУКА И ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ - 2016»**

PROCEEDINGS  
of the XI International Scientific Conference  
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2016 жыл 14 сәуір  
Астана

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**RUSSIAN AND CHINESE POLICIES IN CENTRAL ASIA:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR KAZAKHSTAN**

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Until recent time, the region of Central Asia did not play an important role on Eurasian continent, basically because of its economic weakness, domestic problems, and distrust of integration. Russia's presence in the region as the primary political mediator and economic partner was incontestable. In the last few years, though, China's growing economic interest in Central Asia has come to be more active in the region. Many scholars analyze deeply the competition between the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union and their particular influence on Kazakhstan, which is considered to be a key state in any integration project. It looks like to become a field between China and Russia for regional influence.

To analyze deeply the degree of Russian influence in the Republic of Kazakhstan, it is necessary to mention that, of course both Russia and Kazakhstan are trying to develop different spheres of cooperation as much as it is possible. However, mainly, this cooperation and Russian influence as a result is widespread in three main spheres such as energy (gas, oil, coal and uranium), security (military and space) and political fields (main direction of strong political dialogue and integration under Russian leadership is the EEU).

Russian energy policy in Kazakhstan is carried out of four major companies: Gazprom, Lukoil, Transneft and Rosneft. Their participation in local energy projects gives Russia access to oil and gas reserves of Kazakhstan, while binding the two countries in the energy, transport, space and agriculture sectors.

The basis of the partnership relies on agreements covering petroleum contracts and energy supplies transiting through Kazakhstani and Russian territory to European or Chinese markets. Currently, the leading Russian investor in Kazakhstan is Lukoil, which operates seven projects and has a share in the cross-country Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).

Since January of 2014, Rosneft has been able to transport 7 million tons of oil each year via the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route under an intergovernmental agreement on transmitting Russian oil to China via Kazakhstan. It was signed at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December of 2013. Russian authorities have stated that the transported amount can be increased to 10 million tons. This will allow Russia to expand long-term economic cooperation with Kazakhstan [1].

The third important pipeline between Russia and Kazakhstan is the Atyrau-Samara route, which transfers Kazakh oil to Russia and then to Europe. In 2013, 15.4 million tons of oil was transported via this route [2]. Also, Russian and Kazakhstan use a maritime route in the Caspian Sea between Aktau and Makhachkala to deliver 2.7 million tons of oil [2].

This stable energy partnership between Kazakhstan and Russia is also evident in the gas sector. Two crucial gas pipelines – Central Asia-Center and Bukhara-Ural – that run through Kazakhstan territory let Gazprom expand its resources and guarantee an uninterrupted gas supply abroad. Also, KazMunayGaz and Gazprom established LLP KazRosGas with a 50/50 stake in 2002 to consolidate efforts across a number of new projects.

As a result of Russian investment over the last fifteen years, Russia has obtained a strong position in Kazakhstan fuel and energy, and guaranteed a consistent transit of energy resources.

Apart from oil and gas, Russia is also competitive in the nuclear industry, and here as well Moscow is seeking to expand its present in Kazakhstan. Currently, there are five joint uranium mining ventures, with Russia represented by the company Uranium One. In 2013, the joint output totaled 4,545 tons, with plans to increase that to 6,000 tons. In addition, it is launched a joint Russian-Kazakh commercial center for uranium enrichment on the base of the OJSC Ural Electrochemical plant (the world's largest). Kazatomprom also has a 10 percent share in The International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk. [3]

The Kazakh uranium market is competitive. France, China, and Japan are also presented here. With that in mind, Russia and Kazakhstan signed agreements under which Russian side will build a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan with a capacity range 300-1200 MW and deliver nuclear fuel to it [4]. Russia is ready to offer operating and maintenance services and staff training. In addition, the two countries agreed to adopt a road map for the development of potentially productive uranium mines under a joint venture. Russia will benefit from these initiatives. It is economical for both parties. Russia gains access to potential sources of uranium. Kazakhstan is bound tightly to Russia, and Uranium One has the opportunity to exchange assets with other uranium mining companies.

Russia is also investing in the development of Kazakhstan's economy, starting with a reconstruction project involving Ekibastuz-2 coal regional power station, which will add two energy units and increase the overall output to 4.6 billion kWh per year. Kazakhstan will increase export capacity and the ability to respond to local demand. As a 50 percent stakeholder, Russia can import power primarily to the Omskaya oblast and benefit from Ekibastuz-2's high margins. In 2013, Russia almost doubled its electrical energy import from Kazakhstan, from 1.97 billion kWh in 2012 to 3.9 billion kWh. This reflected the relative competitiveness of Kazakhstani enterprises, as well as Soviet era compatibilities [4].

Russia is also a strong partner for Kazakhstan in military and space sectors. The strategic relations illustrate the fact that between two states Russia granted five S-300PS surface-to-air missile systems to Kazakhstan. The long-term lease of the space-launch complex Baikonur ensures space ties to 2050. Moreover, the Roscosmos Russian Federal Space Agency has an agreement to continue cooperation with KazCosmos, its Kazakhstani equivalent, until 2030 [2]. Finally, Russia and Kazakhstan are the members of the Eurasian Economic Union, which creates stronger economic ties between two states, connect them more politically and lay the foundation for future Russian dominance in the region.

Two main issues define Chinese policy towards Kazakhstan. First, the development of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region through interregional cooperation, roads, and railway construction; and second, obtaining access to Kazakhstan's resources (oil, gas and uranium) and the reliable transit of Turkmen gas to China. In addition, Beijing seeks to expand the presence of Chinese goods in Kazakhstan's markets, deepen cultural ties, and influence the new elite generation with soft power activities [5].

At this stage, economic collaboration between China and Kazakhstan is backed by Beijing's efforts in oil and gas field development, as well as in constructing or renovating the pipeline network to meet China's demand for resources. China's national strategy of replacing coal with gas is driving it to diversify its gas supply routes. As a consequence, Turkmen gas is being transported through Kazakhstan on its way to China, developing new transportation networks.

However, China is not focusing only on oil-gas negotiations. For instance, China is market for uranium. This has prompted talks between Kazatomprom, CNNC and CGNPC, which have agreed to export 24.2 tons of uranium to China by 2020 from mining joint ventures [6].

According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the gross inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled \$24.1 billion in 2013, with China accounting for 9 percent and Russia 5.4 percent. Going forward, China is clearly set to dominate in the realm of investment. [6]

Although Chinese funds are helping to create joint ventures, rebuild vital infrastructure (in particular, the Kazakh stretch of the road to Western Europe), there is rising concern in Kazakhstan about the “China threat.” To counter this, Beijing is pursuing a soft power strategy to improve its image. There are more than 20 scientific centers dedicated to Central Asian studies in China. Beijing opened four Confucius institutes (Almaty, Astana, Aktobe, Karaganda) and offered places at Chinese universities to more than 10,000 Kazakhstani students. Moreover, the China Bridge foundation organizes advanced training courses for Kazakhstani employees of the Confucius Institute.

China and Kazakhstan are eager to develop ties in the logistics, communications, and aviation sectors. China’s program for the development of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, known as “China Western Development,” will be realized till 2050. Until then, Beijing will certainly import resources, form transit corridors, and provide assistance to Chinese business. To conclude the above discussions on Russia-Chinese cooperation and competition with the main implications for Kazakhstan, it is necessary to turn to the SWOT analysis.

The advantage of Russia policy in Kazakhstan lies in the shared heritage in the form of the Soviet Union. As a result of economic interdependence during that period, Russia retained its position in Kazakhstan’s economy and was able to deepen integration between the countries. Moreover, there were 3.7 million ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan in 2013, representing nearly 22 percent of the total population.

The weakness in Russian policy towards Kazakhstan refers to its Central Asian policy in general: Russia’s policy for influence in the former Soviet lands comes up against Central Asian states’ insistence on their sovereignty and their unwillingness to accept second-role status. In this case, Russian aid and investment are seen very much as tools of hard power, but Russia struggles to shape an image as a reliable partner or donor.

Only in recent years Russia has begun to pay attention to soft power, and develop the tools (Rossotrudnichestvo, Russkiy Mir, Russia Today, Russia Beyond the Headlines, Voice of Russia) that might help transmit a positive Russian image abroad. In the meantime, China and the United States have developed their own presence in the region by means of soft power instruments, and it has seen a decline in Russian language use in the region. Young people in Central Asia today are more interested in studying in English and Chinese, rather than Russian language.

However, there is a positive trend in strengthening the role of Russia as a major educational center in CIS [7]. In CA Russia has a significant attractiveness for foreign students (price and quality of education, the reputation of soviet educational system and etc.). It should also be noted that Russia has a positive experience in the field of Network University of the CIS countries (in the format of Master degree). The aim of its creation is the development and implementation of analogue to the “Erasmus Mundus” program of in the framework of a common educational space of the CIS. In 2008, the project was initiated by the People’s Friendship University of Russia. The Network University Consortium includes 16 leading universities from 8 countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine. The project aims at the development of cooperation and inter-institutional relationships in higher education in the CIS countries. After receiving basic education in a high school (in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus), students from the CIS countries may be enrolled in Russian graduate programs in the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow State University, Moscow State Institute of International Relations and other universities.

There is a University of the SCO, which also functions on an equal cooperation between Russian, Chinese and Kazakh universities. Taking into account the positive experience of the University of SCO, promising project would be to create the Eurasian University, which would prepare specialists, including in the field of integration for the countries of the Eurasian Union. This is especially important for Russia, because the region of CA is united by a common historical past, a large part of the population of which speaks in Russian. Russian educational system can become an effective soft power instrument of foreign policy [8].

There are different views to predict opportunities for Russian policy in Central Asia in general and in Kazakhstan particularly. So, among opportunities is, firstly, the fact of further development of close Kazakh-Russian partnership in the framework of EEU with the co-existence of Chinese SREB. Secondly, Russia and China might find a consensus on a further SCO development with an economic aspect, where both of the sides might benefit as well as Kazakhstan. Thirdly, Russia might empower its influence in Kazakhstan within a security vector by means of ensuring measures inside of OTCS or giving to the EEU a security character.

China's policy strengths in Kazakhstan are based on three components. First, it benefits from a multifaceted, long-term approach that is less related to political influence, since its Central Asia strategy is coupled with the development of its troubled Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. China is focused on achieving stability. Second, China possesses wide range of financial resources, and this will drive deeper investment and credit relations with Kazakhstan, which is seeking for it. Third, China tries to influence on political decisions through economic relations and is able to avoid the more powerful approach associated with Russia.

A major problem with the Chinese strategy is a soft power mechanism that is ineffective at offsetting the "China threat" stereotype. Kazakhstan is wary of any dependence on Chinese imports and the decline of domestic industries such as textiles and footwear. The fierce competition between Chinese and Kazakh sellers is evident in local markets, where half of the turnover might be controlled by Chinese interests.

Among opportunities for Chinese policy in Kazakhstan there are several ones, which can be similar to the Russian ones; however, they have a different color, where China is playing a leading role. Firstly, China might spread its economic influence in Kazakhstan just by means of simple investment and trade flows, in accordance with its domestic policy for XUAR, which will not be able competitive with Russian investment and trade level in Kazakhstan. Secondly, popularization of Chinese projects in Kazakhstan, especially in energy sector, might become higher because of the quick economic results for Kazakhstan, where the fact of Russian economy decline might lead to the closer partnership between China and Kazakhstan.

Now, the most pressing problem, which can become a threat in the future of the Kazakhstan-China-Russia triangle is competition for influence in the sphere of natural resources, which might be provoked by the third side. The second significant moment in the China-Russia rivalry in Kazakhstan is the issue of the next stage of SCO development, in particular, its economic component. Here both sides cannot reach agreement on the creation of an SCO Development Bank and further economic integration of the organization [9]. The third reason for clash of interests between Russia and China might become a security issue, connected to the geopolitical "hot spots" as XUAR and Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan should balance between two sides which is difficult. On the one side, Russian and Kazakhstani leaders historically have strong ties, which the Eurasian Economic Union seeks to enhance. On the other, Kazakhstan is keen to attract Chinese money. Both China and Russia have a strong attraction for Kazakhstan, guaranteeing development and helping to block terrorism and separatism.

Despite many scholars consider partnership with Russia as a weakness, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2014-2020 makes clear that under the Treaty on Good-Neighborhood and Alliance in the XXI Century, Russia will remain Kazakhstan's primary partner. Kazakh political analysts believe that it is necessary to use Chinese and Russian presence in favor of Kazakhstan's socio-economic development. Among recommendations for Kazakhstan foreign policy, the first and main rule in cooperation with any foreign partner is to put national interests in the center. Second, all agreements with foreign investors should be open. Thirdly, taking into account incomparability of economies of China and Russia with the economies of the Central Asia states it is necessary to develop other forms of integration. The Eurasian Economic Union is one of the options. Fourthly, the priority areas of cooperation should, on the one hand, meet industrial and innovative development of Kazakhstan, and from the other hand, provide competitive advantages for the country.

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## ROLE OF DIPLOMATIC STUDENTS' CLUBS IN PROFESSIONAL SKILLS DEVELOPMENT

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“Practice makes perfect” – this ubiquitous adage may be applied to all occupations but it seems to fit the diplomatic profession the most. It goes without saying that rewarding skills and hands-on experience diplomatic students can reap from their participation in university clubs are the sine qua non for career furtherment after college graduation. Many diplomatic activists and leaders who reach the height of their career spent years of student's life actively and effectively joining in students' clubs. Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of United Nations, is the epitome of a success story associated with professional skills advancement from students' clubs. He is known to be a staunch supporter of Model United Nations conferences in many parts of the world which he used to a member of when he was a student. In this symposium, the nexus between diplomatic students' clubs and professional skills is going to be elucidated around four major touchstones: confidence building, negotiation arts, diplomatic etiquette and professionalism.

As for a diplomat, the first contributor to the success of his career has to be the confidence. “In a broad sense, diplomacy is the entire process through which states conduct their foreign relations” . The sheer connotation of the word “diplomacy” undoubtedly conjures up the image of events, meetings, conferences, parties where a great number of officials from different countries and different nationalities show up. Furthermore, it is widely known that diplomats bear the responsibility to represent the image of their countries and so everything exudes from their deeds and words will be seemingly inquisitively judged. They have to assert their ideas or opinions, know what to say and how to say it without damaging the relationship by causing offence. This pressure is bound to discourage shy and timid people from becoming a diplomat. That is the reason why diplomatic clubs strive to draw the attention of reserved or lonely students, especially freshmen, to