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The proceedings are the papers of students, undergraduates, doctoral students and young researchers on topical issues of natural and technical sciences and humanities.

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аумақтан тыс жерге көшіру, яғни оны бір қарағанда бұл қақтығысқа қатысы жоқ басқа мемлекеттердің аумағына экспорттау. Осы тұрғыдан алғанда Орталық Азия мемлекеттері үшін өте қауіпті көршілес. Сонымен қатар, Шыңжаңда тәуелсіз ұйғыр мемлекетін құру идеясын Орталық Азияның ұйғыр халқы (әсіресе жастар) тікелей немесе жанама түрде мақұлдайды, бұл Пекин тарапынан аймақтағы «ұйғыр қозғалысының» өсіп келе жатқан ықпалына айтарлықтай алаңдаушылық туғызады. Осылайша, бұл проблема Қытай үкіметінің, ұйғыр сепаратистерінің және әлемдік қоғамдастықтың талқылауы үшін де, тікелей әрекеті үшін де ашық болып қала бермек.

Қолданылған әдебиеттер тізімі

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POSITIONS AND INTERESTS OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS

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The socio-political crisis in Syria (SAR) began in the spring of 2011. Quite quickly, the local civil confrontation grew into a large-scale civil war. Without removing the responsibility from the Syrian authorities, it is important to state that the most active part in this conflict, almost from the very beginning, was taken by international terrorist groups and organizations professing a radical ideology. The level of involvement in the Syrian conflict of other countries, including the leading world powers and all neighboring states without exception, is also unprecedented.

Russia's position. Russia's policy on the problem of Syria in 2011-2012 was mainly based on blocking UN Security Council forceful resolutions, which placed all responsibility on President Bashar al-Assad. Russia's concerns were related to the possibility of using the proposed resolutions to legitimize foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict. However, the foreign policy activity of the Russian leadership was also driven by geopolitical, strategic and economic interests in Syria, perceived as Russia's last stronghold in the Arab Middle East.

Soviet influence spread to Syria as early as the 1950s under President Shukri al-Quwatli, and with Hafez al-Assad coming to power in 1970, Damascus became a consistent Soviet ally and one of the Middle Eastern main arms importers. In 1990s, arms supply was suspended due to unpaid

debts. Then it was partially resumed in 1998-1999 and after the visit of President B. al-Assad to Moscow in 2005, arms supply returned in its full capacity. An agreement was reached to write off 73% of the Syrian debt (out of a total amount of \$13.5 billion) in exchange for signed contracts in the field of energy and weapons [1, p.9]. Thus, while supporting the regime of B. al-Assad, the Russian authorities maintained a certain continuity of the Soviet political idea to prevent a number of negative consequences for Russian interests, which were fraught with the victory of the opposition. These include:

1. the loss of the largest sales market for Russian military equipment and weapons;
2. liquidation of the only foreign Russian naval base in Tartus, which allows maintaining a military presence in the Persian Gulf and access to the Mediterranean Sea;
3. the radicalization of Syria's foreign policy under the influence of Islamist groups, which would increase pressure on the Russian North Caucasus;
4. a threat to the position of victory of Islamic radicals, as, for example, happened in Iraq after the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein or in Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood came to power.

Defending its national interests in the region and on the world stage, Russia prevented a military strike on Syria in September 2013, planned by the Obama administration due to the use of chemical weapons by one of the conflicting parties. Rejecting the possibility of a military invasion to the Syria, Russia has proposed an initiative, backed by President Assad, to place Syria's chemical weapons under international control and phase them out, which has helped to temporarily stabilize the situation.

This was probably the first time, when Russia opposed the United States at the global level as an equal international actor. In addition, the Russian side has consistently supported the policy of 'non-intervention' of foreign states in matters of Syrian domestic policy, seeing ways out of the crisis only in the all-Syrian dialogue. However, as is known, the conflict in the Syrian Republic developed in a different scenario. As the potential of the opposition grew due to the number of their allies and, accordingly, the escalation of the conflict, the scale of intervention of international actors also increased. The armed forces of Russia (introduced under an agreement with President Assad and contributing to the defeat of the largest terrorist groups), the United States, Iran and Turkey are directly involved in hostilities. Material, financial and technical support for the opposition forces is provided by Saudi Arabia and other monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Jordan and Turkey.

Neighboring states, such as, first of all, Israel, Iraq and Lebanon, fight against the Islamic State terrorist organization, the United States and Saudi Arabia created international and regional coalitions, which increased the number of states involved in the Syrian conflict [2, p.16]. Such a large-scale foreign participation in the Syrian crisis, where each of the actors, in addition to the imperative to fight terrorism, defends its own interests, while striving to prevent influence of other participants in the region, on the one hand, hinders the conflict settlement, and on the other entails the formation of new geopolitical realities in the Middle East.

Russia's active participation in the Syrian crisis has radically changed its status, turning it into one of the main, if not the leading, actors in the Middle East political arena [3]. Moscow's support to President Assad made it possible to maintain the ruling regime in Syria and prevent the seizure of power by radical Islamist groups, which was fully in line with Russian national interests.

However, at the same time, this led to the freezing of relations with Saudi Arabia and other states of the Persian Gulf that began to develop fruitfully - members of the Gulf Cooperation

Council organization, which, together with the Arab League, is playing an ever-increasing role in regional politics.

Russia's cooperation with Iran, the main antagonist of the Arabian monarchies and Israel in the region, played a significant role in this. At the same time, despite the tactical commonality of interests with Tehran, which also supported the Assad regime, there were strategic contradictions in Russian-Iranian approaches. Thus, Russia wants to see Syria as a secular state in which all confessions and ethnic groups will be equal. Iran is determined to assist the Syrians in the formation of such a state structure that would preserve the advantage of the Alawites (the Shiite in Islam) and other religious minorities over the Sunni majority.

This would allow Iran to strengthen its military and political positions in Syria and throughout the Middle East by creating a 'Shiite arc' from Iran through Iraq, Syria to Lebanon' [4, p.18].

At the moment, one can also notice elements of the rivalry between Russia and Iran (which has a more significant military presence in the conflict zone) for influence in Syria, the prospects of which largely depend on the actions of the United States on the 'nuclear dossier' of Iran. In the event of the expansion of US sanctions, Iran, on the one hand, will be economically and politically weakened, which will consolidate Russia's geopolitical advantage in the region, on the other hand, it will be forced to move closer to Moscow on an anti-Western basis. This, in turn, will create a serious foreign policy dilemma for Russia, which, if such a scenario develops, risks its, the scale of which has increased and diversified significantly since the Syrian crisis beginning.

Most important markers of the development of bilateral relations can be, firstly, the position of Israel on the problem of Ukraine, according to which Tel Aviv abstained from voting in March 2014 at the UN General Assembly on a resolution condemning the reunification of Crimea with Russia, and also not joined the US and European economic sanctions regime; secondly, the position of Russia, which in April 2017 recognized West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, albeit with the proviso that East Jerusalem would become the capital of the future Palestinian state [5, p.14], and thirdly, the successful overcoming of crisis caused by the crash with the Russian Il-20 aircraft in September 2018. We can also note the positive dynamics in the development of cooperation in the economic, energy, military (to a lesser extent) and, in particular, the humanitarian and tourism sectors. At the same time, undoubtedly, there remains a range of political issues on which Russian and Israeli positions do not coincide.

This concerns, first of all, the role of Iran in the Syrian crisis; Moscow's military and nuclear cooperation with Tehran, which poses a threat to Israel's security; the loyal attitude of Russia, which is the guarantor of the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA) on the nuclear issue of Iran, to Tehran's failure to comply with the terms of the agreement; as well as the prospects for the restoration of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

Russia's relations with another significant regional actor, Turkey, are extremely uneven, ranging from dynamically developing cooperation, mainly in the field of energy, to the actual freezing of contacts between the parties. Despite serious political disagreements in the early 2010s due to different approaches to the Syrian conflict and the status of Crimea, in 2014 the scale of cooperation increased significantly, which was directly related to the Moscow leadership's refusal to build the South Stream pipeline and replace it with Turkish Stream.

In addition to the political significance of this project, which symbolizes the tension in relations between both Russia and Turkey with the European Union, the expansion of the existing Blue Stream network with a gas hub on the border of Greece and Turkey to ensure the supply of Russian gas to the states of Southern Europe should not only increase the level of exported raw

materials, but also in the future to give Russia the opportunity to enter the Asian markets. The development of Russian-Turkish relations in the field of energy was also evidenced by the approved project for the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Mersin by the state corporation Rosatom. Relations reached their lowest point as a result of the Su-24 bomber incident in November 2015.

Despite the differing approaches to the strategy for a peaceful settlement in Syria, concerning, for example, the Kurdish issue, and a number of other regional problems, developing ties with the government of Ankara will strengthen Russia's position in the region.

The ongoing acute conflict in relations between the states involved in the Syrian conflict, the Russian leadership needs to develop a balanced and pragmatic approach that involves active political maneuvering. Russia is the only state that retains the possibility of political dialogue with virtually all competing regional players, and can use its influence to simultaneously contain Israel and help smooth out the contradictions between the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey to de-escalate the Syrian crisis and in the post-conflict settlement process.

Having restored the status of a major international actor in the region of Western Asia, Russia has been strengthening its positions in North Africa in recent years.

After the new president, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, came to power in Egypt, who proclaimed himself the successor of G. A. Nasser, a traditional ally of Moscow, Russian-Egyptian relations received a new impetus. This direction appeared especially significant African Union, having taken the place of Libya as the informal leader of the integration processes on the African continent.

Thus, one of the strategic tasks of Russian foreign policy is not only economic and military-technical cooperation with the ARE, but also political interaction at the regional and international levels. To this end, in October 2018, an Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation was signed between Russia and Egypt, and within the framework of the summit and the Russia-Africa Economic Forum held in Sochi in October 2019, the leaders of the Russian Federation and Egypt spoke as co-chairs.

In connection with new trends in the world political and economic arena, the strategic importance of Russia's cooperation with the countries of the region was growing. It is superfluous to recall the geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the Middle East, especially in an environment where energy resources act as a powerful political tool. Russia and the Middle Eastern states are the central players in the global energy market, since they account for more than two thirds of all explored oil and gas reserves, which necessitates a coordinated policy in the energy sector, the implementation of which is possible only with long-term and mutually beneficial partnership relations. This requires the development of the most multivector foreign policy course, including, among other things, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, relations with which are stagnating at this stage.

It is also important that in matters of economic cooperation with the Middle East, Russia can act as a developed state exporting goods of medium and high technology, while in relations with Western countries, Russia is mostly perceived as a 'supplier of raw material'.

For Russia, a country with a Muslim population of many millions, cooperation or confrontation with the world of Islam can have no less important strategic consequences than the nature of relations with Western countries and China.

United States position. The United States, in order to reform Syria's foreign policy in the direction of subordination and controllability, tried to break the Assad regime. Solving this problem, the Americans resorted to the following methods in the ethno-confessional sphere:

- artificially provoking and stimulating Sunni-Shia disagreements;
- warming up of Islamic-Christian contradictions;
- deepening the Kurdish problem;
- slowing down the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is also appropriate to note that a distinctive feature of the situation in the SAR is the multifactorial combinatorics of interaction and confrontation between a wide range of world and regional forces to maintain their own positions in the Middle East region.

Iran's position. Iran has largely determined the main parameters. Syrian conflict largely depends on Iran's position. The Russian Federation and Iran are cooperating in achieving peace in Syria, but there are certain discrepancies in their vision of ways out of the crisis. At the same time, relations between Russia and Iran are determined by a much wider range of issues of mutual interest and are not limited to the Syrian problem.

'Arab Spring' unfolded in Iran, the revolutionary events in the Arab states were generally greeted positively. There were tens of thousands of demonstrations and rallies in Tehran in support of the Arab revolutionary movements. Tehran's domestic and foreign policy plans were influenced by the situation in the region, according to Iranian leaders.

In defending its gains in the Middle East, Iran's foreign policy was put to the test by the revolution in Syria that began on March 15, 2011. It is no secret that Iran over the past two decades, and it does not want the was conducted from Damascus.

Iran and development of their cooperation. During the Syrian crisis, the Islamic Republic warned its Middle Eastern neighbors that it would immediately intervene in Syria's affairs if external interference occurred.

Approximately 10,000 Iranian troops were in Syria by December 2013, according to Western media reports. The hostilities also involved several thousand Hezbollah fighters. Reports in 2014 indicated that Iran was expanding its support for Bashar al-Assad by putting elite teams at his disposal for intelligence gathering and training.

In fact, Syrian events posed the greatest threat to Iranian interests in the Middle East. If events unfold in Syria in the way they are expected to, Iranian positions in the Middle East may be seriously damaged, weakening Tehran's chances of implementing its nuclear program and shaking Iranian internal political stability. Islamic awakening is seen by Iran's ruling elite as a result of the revolutions in the Arab world. Sunni Islam may become stronger in Arab countries if regimes change, which would weaken their position in the region. Iran's moral authority will be undermined if the SAR revolution succeeds. Internal divisions will be exacerbated and confidence in the regime will be shaken.

Iranian positions in the region are unlikely to give up so easily despite the difficulties Iran faces in conjunction with the Arab revolutions. Despite the fact that Iran is facing a great threat, Tehran needs to prepare for the battle for its survival.

Meanwhile, Iran has limited options for open combat. Iranian economy is highly dependent on world oil prices because of the unfavorable economic situation. Many Iranians are serving as commanders of government troops in hostilities, European and American intelligence agencies have repeatedly stated. Iranian military personnel are believed to enter Syrian territory mainly through the central regions of Iraq, according to Western media. The military campaign is also allegedly unsustainable for Iran. Iranian government expenditures on these purposes are at least \$6 billion per year, according to Western media.

Syria may, however, in the future face military coups and revolutions even if the tasks set are accomplished. Despite the risk of a deterioration in the country's economic condition, Tehran

would not be deterred by the costs of supporting President Assad, regardless of the costs of its presence in Syria.

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ВЫШЕГРАД «ТӨРТТІГІ» ЖӘНЕ ЕУРОПАЛЫҚ ИНТЕГРАЦИЯНЫҢ ДАМУЫ

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Вышеград елдері (Венгрия, Польша, Чехия, Словакия), 2004 жылы және одан кейін Еуропалық Одаққа кірген басқа мемлекеттерден айырмашылығы, ЕО-ға тек ескі мүшелердің үміттерін қанағаттандыру және олардың еуропалық саясатының фарватерінде болу үшін емес, өзінің күш орталығын құру үшін кірді. Еуропалық одақ. 2005 жылы неміс тарихшысы Карл Шлегель өзінің «Орталық-Шығыста» атты еңбегінде [1] «Орталық Еуропа – бұл фантастика емес, тарихи байланысты аймақ», - деп жазды. Вышеград тобы қатысушы мемлекеттердің саяси тәуелсіздігін қорғауды мақсат етті. 2004 жылға дейін бұл елдер еуроатлантикалық құрылымдарға интеграция процесінде бір-бірін қолдауға деген ұмтылыспен біріктірілді, ал ЕО-ға кіргеннен кейін олар ЕуроОдақ ішіндегі топтың мүдделерін бірлесіп қолдайды.

Атом энергетикасы және «Еуропалық жасыл мәміле».

Атом энергетикасы- Вышеград елдерінің ынтымақтастығы және олардың еуропалық саяси ағымның бір бөлігімен қайшылықтары. Венгрияда, Словакияда және Чехияда атом электр станциялары жұмыс істейді, олардың бір бөлігі жаңа энергия блоктарын салуды көздейді, ал Польша өз аумағында бірінші атом станциясын салу жоспарын жариялады. Австрия мен Германия Вышеград елдерінде атом энергетикасының күшеюіне қарсы. Бірақ Франция бұл мәселеде соңғысын қолдайды. «Еуропалық жасыл мәмілені» талқылау кезінде Вышеград елдері атом энергетикасын атмосфераға зиянды шығарындыларды азайтуды